

Tim Juvshik

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Nationality: Canadian

RESEARCH

Areas of Specialization: Metaphysics, Philosophy of Technology

Areas of Competence: Philosophy of Science, Epistemology, Philosophy of Art, Critical Thinking, Social and Political Philosophy, Applied Ethics (Medical, Environmental, Business, Technological)

EMPLOYMENT

Visiting Assistant Professor, Middlebury College 2023 – present

Visiting Assistant Professor, Clemson University 2022 – 2023

EDUCATION

Ph.D. in Philosophy 2022

University of Massachusetts Amherst, USA

Dissertation: *A Metaphysics of Artifacts: Essence and Mind-Dependence*

Committee: Ned Markosian (chair), Hilary Kornblith,

Amie Thomasson, Phil Bricker

M.A. in Philosophy (transferred) 2016

McGill University, Montreal, Canada

M.A. in Philosophy 2013

Queen's University, Kingston, Canada

B.A. in Philosophy and Political Science 2012

Lakehead University, Thunder Bay, Canada

PUBLICATIONS

Peer Reviewed Articles

“Artifacts and Mind-Dependence” *Synthese* vol. 199 no. 3-4 (2021): 9313-9336.

“Artificialization without Physical Modification” *Res Philosophica*, vol. 98 no. 4 (2021): 545-572.

“Function Essentialism about Artifacts” *Philosophical Studies* vol. 178 no. 9 (2021): 2943-2964.

“Good ‘Cat’, Bad ‘Act’” *Philosophia* vol. 49 no. 3 (2021): 1007-1019.

“Relativity and the Causal Efficacy of Abstract Objects” *American Philosophical Quarterly* vol. 57 no. 3 (2020): 269-282.

“Abstract Objects, Causal Efficacy, and Causal Exclusion” *Erkenntnis* vol. 83 no. 4 (August, 2018): 805-827.

Public Philosophy, Reviews, etc.

“AI Exemplifies the Free Rider Problem – Here’s Why That Points Towards Regulation” *The Conversation*, May 5th, 2023.

“Review of Joshua Mozerky, *Time, Language, and Ontology: The World from the B-theoretic Perspective*” *Dialogue* vol. 55 no. 3 (September, 2016): 574-576.

WORKS IN PROGRESS

“Artifacts and Social Dependence” (R&R)

“Realism and Artifact Kinds”

“What Makes a Kind an *Artifact* Kind?”

“A Causal Theory of Reference for Artifact Kind Terms”

PRESENTATIONS

“Artifacts and Social Dependence”, South Carolina Society for Philosophy, Hilton Head Island, SC, March 2023

Comments on Ryan Miller, “Artifacts: Ontology As Easy As It Gets”, Eastern APA, Montreal, January 2023

“Artifacts and Social Dependence” Invited Colloquium, Université de Neuchâtel, Neuchâtel, Switzerland, October 2021

“What Makes a Kind an *Artifact* Kind? The Historical Case of Chopines” Changing Values, Changing Technologies, Technical University of Delft, Netherlands, October 2021

“Artifacts and Social Dependence”, International Social Ontology Society, UCSD, San Diego, USA, August 2021

“How Blurred Is the Line Between Artifacts and Natural Kinds?”, Society for Philosophy and Technology, Lille, France, June 2021

“Good ‘Cat’, Bad ‘Act’”, Pacific APA, Portland, CA, April 2021

“Are Artworks Necessarily Artifacts?”, American Society for Aesthetics Annual Meeting, Phoenix, AZ, October 2019

Comments on D. Andrews, “Personal Identity, Progressive Dementia, and Advance Directives”, Canadian Philosophical Association, UBC, Vancouver, June 2019

“Against a Neo-Quinean Metaontology”, Canadian Philosophical Association, UBC, Vancouver, June 2019

“Intuitions, Evidence, and Inclinations to Believe”, Society for Exact Philosophy, York University, Toronto, May 2019

“Are Artworks Necessarily Artifacts?”, Canadian Philosophical Association, UQÀM, Montréal, June 2018

“Relativity and the Causal Efficacy of Abstract Objects”, Society for the Metaphysics of Science Panel Discussion, Pacific APA, San Diego, CA, March 2018

Participant, ‘Ontology and Metaontology’ Summer School, CEU, Budapest, July 2017

“Relativity and the Causal Efficacy of Abstract Objects”, Canadian Philosophical Association, Ryerson University, Toronto, May 2017

“Are Artworks Necessarily Artifacts?”, University of Albany (SUNY) Graduate Conference, Albany, NY, April 2017

“Relativity and the Causal Efficacy of Abstract Objects”, Pitt-CMU Graduate Conference, Pittsburgh, PA, March 2017

“Relativity and the Causal Efficacy of Abstract Objects”, Central APA, Kansas City, March 2017

“Against a Neo-Quinean Metaontology”, Society for the Study of the History of Analytic Philosophy, Metropolitan State University of Denver, USA, June 2016

“The Causal Theory of Reference and the Nature of Artifacts”, Canadian Philosophical Association, University of Calgary, Canada, June 2016

Comments on M. Backmann, “I Tensed the Laws and the Laws Won: Non-Eternalist Humeanism”, Canadian Philosophical Association, University of Calgary, Canada, May 2016

“Dodd sur l’efficacité causale des objets abstraits”, Société de philosophie analytique, UQÀM, Canada, June 2015

“Dodd on the Causal Efficacy of Abstracta”, Canadian Philosophical Association, University of Ottawa, Canada, June 2015

Comments on H. McIntyre, “Kinds and Category Cognition”, Canadian Philosophical Association, University of Ottawa, Canada, June 2015

“Dodd on the Causal Efficacy of Abstracta”, Dubrovnik Philosophy of Art Conference, IUC, Croatia, April 2015

Participant ‘Individuals and Indeterminacy: Perspectives in Contemporary Ontology’, Summer School, University of Bamberg, Germany, July 2014

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Middlebury

Logic
Philosophy of Technology

Clemson

Social and Political Philosophy
Philosophy of Technology x2
Intro to Philosophy x2

UMass

Philosophy of Technology
Intro to Social and Political Philosophy
Intro to Philosophy x2
Critical Thinking
Environmental Ethics
Medical Ethics x3
Critical Thinking x2 (TA)
Medical Ethics (TA)

McGill

Logic (TA)
Contemporary Moral Issues x2 (TA)
Philosophy of Religion (TA)
Intro to Philosophy x2 (TA)

Queen's

Philosophy of Mind (TA)
Biomedical Ethics (TA)

COURSE HISTORY

Graduate Courses Taken (indicates audit)*

UMass

Metaphysics of Modality* (Bricker)
Material Constitution* (Markosian)
Modal Logic (Hardegreve)
Epistemic Agency (Kornblith)
Intuitions (Meacham)
Expressivism (Perez-Carballo)
Causation (Eddon)
Pro-seminar 2 (Markosian, de Harven)
Pro-seminar 1 (Horowitz, Perez-Carballo)
Metaontology (Bricker)
Philosophy of Art (Markosian)

McGill

Philosophy of Geometry (Schlimm)
Hegel (di Giovanni)

Metaphysics of Artifacts (Davies)
Ontology of Art (Davies)
Reasons and Rationality (Reisner)
Philosophy of Social Science (Davies,
Buckley)
Epistemology (Blome-Tillman)
Personal Identity (Stoljar)
Theories of Reference (Davies)

Queen's

Aristotle's Ethics (Leighton)
Wittgenstein (Mercier)
Metaphysics (Bakhurst)
Philosophy of Time (Mozersky)
Animal Ethics (Kymlicka)
Formal Methods in Philosophy (Mercier)

HONOURS AND AWARDS

Robison Teaching Award, 2019

UMass Summer Dissertation Fellowship, 2019

Canadian Philosophical Association Annual Meeting Student Essay Prize, 2017

Bennett Scholarship, 2016

UMass Amherst Puryear Fellowship, 2016

Reverend Gaultieri Prize, 2014

Ontario-Rhône-Alpes Exchange Student Bursary, 2010

Lakehead University Entrance Scholarship, 2008

LANGUAGES

English (Native)

French (Advanced)

SERVICE TO THE PROFESSION

Advisory Board, Office of Teaching Effectiveness and Innovation, Clemson (2022-2023)

Ethics Bowl Coach, Clemson University (2022-2023)

Panelist, UMass Graduate Teaching Workshop (2021, 2022)

Co-Founder, UMass Amherst Chapter of Minorities and Philosophy (MAP) (2020)

Course Developer, Philosophy of Technology, UMass Amherst (2020)

Climate Committee Member, Department of Philosophy, UMass Amherst (2018-2019)

Reviewer for the Canadian Philosophical Association Annual Meeting (2018, 2019)

Reviewer for *Dialogue* (2016, 2021), *Journal of the American Philosophical Association* (2021), *Erkenntnis* (2021, 2023 x2), *Philosophia* (2021, 2023), *Synthese* (2022 x3, 2023), *Dialectica* (2022, 2023)

PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS

Canadian Philosophical Association

Society for the Study of the History of Analytic Philosophy

American Philosophical Association

American Society for Aesthetics

European Society for Aesthetics

Society for Exact Philosophy

Society for Philosophy and Technology

International Social Ontology Society

REFERENCES

Ned Markosian (UMass Amherst)
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Hilary Kornblith (UMass Amherst)
send.Kornblith.7EACACB439@interfolio.com
[m](#)

Amie L. Thomasson (Dartmouth College)
send.Thomasson.9A3417B766@interfolio.com
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Phillip Bricker (UMass Amherst)
send.Bricker.D469597195@interfolio.com

Maya Eddon (UMass Amherst)
send.Eddon.68CA4E27E6@interfolio.com

A Metaphysics of Artifacts: Essence and Mind-Dependence

Dissertation Abstract

My dissertation explores the nature of artifacts – things like chairs, tables, and pinball machines – and addresses the question of whether there is anything essential to being an artifact and a member of a particular artifact kind. My dissertation offers new arguments against both the anti-essentialist and current essentialist proposals. Roughly put, the view is that artifacts are successful products of an intention to make something with certain features constitutive of an artifact kind. The constitutive features are often functional features, but may include structural, material, aesthetic, and other features. I further explore the ways in which artifacts are mind-dependent and I argue that this dependence is disjunctive. Not only do they depend on the intentions of their makers, but they also can depend on social groups or public norms and thus artifacts have an importantly social dimension.

In Chapter 1 I adopt the pragmatic constraint as a method for evaluating proposals about the nature of artifacts. This method involves extracting a list of pre-theoretic features from our practices and balancing them in a process of reflective equilibrium against our theoretical commitments. I then apply the pragmatic constraint to various realist proposals about the nature of artifacts and show how they violate its strictures. The realist proposals are too revisionary so should be rejected as accounts of artifacts. Chapter 2 explores mind-dependence. I argue that intention-dependence is the default position in our practices, while offering counterexamples to the intuitive claim that artifacts must be the result of intentional physical modification. Artifacts can be created through appropriation; I can move a piece of driftwood from the beach to my kitchen without modifying it and genuinely make a wine rack. I then consider whether swamp cases, such as an object which materializes in a swamp that is intrinsically identical to a standard chair, show that artifacts can be mind-independent and offer various error theories about such intuitions.

Chapter 3 argues against function essentialism, the view that to be an artifact, an object must have some function and that artifact kinds are individuated by a unique, shared function. I consider counterexamples to both claims, including functionless artworks and non-art artifacts like doodles, sandcastles, and some toys, as well as showroom models which need not share a function with their kind. I defend these cases against Randall Dipert's view that the maker's purpose is the object's function and Simon Evnine's view that artifacts have two functions which may conflict. I then consider Lynn Baker's attempt to restrict function essentialism to technical artifacts and show how this fails to secure *essentialism*.

In Chapter 4 I present a novel account of artifact essences. Artifacts are the successful result of an intention to make something of a given artifact kind, where this intention is to bestow various kind-relevant features on an object. While function is often central, other criterial features may include form, material constitution, aesthetic qualities or geographic origin. I argue that none of the criterial features is individually necessary so I advance a cluster account. In addition to their clusters of constitutive features, I argue that artifacts exhibit a disjunctive kind of mind-dependence: they can either be dependent on a single individual maker's intentions or collectively dependent on social groups or public norms.

Chapter 5 considers the question of what makes a kind an *artifact* kind. We can distinguish between artifactual and natural kinds by distinguishing between essential and accidental artifact kinds – a chair is essentially artifactual while uranium-235 is only accidentally artifactual since it can also occur naturally. The disjunctive mind-dependence of artifacts allows us to distinguish artifacts from institutional and social kinds because the latter *necessarily* depend on collective intentions. I also argue that we can distinguish artifact kinds from each other by appeal to the social norms which constitute the associated social practice. To illustrate the social practice view, I consider the historical case of chopines, elevated shoes worn by Venetian sex workers during the Renaissance. Our artifact kinds are the result of contingent socio-historical developments which can and do change in concert with changes in the associated social practices.

Chapter 6 considers the reference of artifact kind terms. I substitute my account of artifacts into the causal theory and show reference of artifact and natural kind terms function analogously. Recent arguments from Diego Marconi, Irene Olivero and Amie Thomasson aim to undercut the causal theory, but Marconi's and Olivero's arguments hinge on an implausible view of essence, while Thomasson's argument hinges on a particular solution to the qua-problem which we need not accept.